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Abstract
The notion of Universal Designated-Verifier Signatures was
put forth by Steinfeld et. al. in Asiacrypt 2003. This notion
allows a signature holder to designate the signature to a
desired designated-verifier. In this paper, we extend this notion to allow a signature holder to designate the signature
to multi verifiers, and hence, we call our scheme as Universal Designated Multi Verifier Signatures. We provide security proofs for our schemes based on the random oracle
model.

1. Introduction
Due to the abundance of electronic applications of digital
signatures, many additional properties are needed. The notion of undeniable signature was proposed by Chaum and
van Antwerpen in 1989 [3]. In this notion, the signature is
only verifiable with the signer’s consent by engaging interactively or non-interactively in a confirmation or disavowal
protocol. In short, undeniable signatures are not universally
verifiable. This notion is useful in cryptography such as in
licensing software and auctions. It was known that this type
of signature schemes has some drawbacks due to blackmailing and mafia attacks [6, 5]. To overcome this problem,
designated-verifier technique was proposed in [7], by allowing a non-interactive proof provided by the signer. This
scheme is known to be the first non-interactive scheme of
Chaum’s scheme [2]. The idea of constructing designated
verifier signature schemes from any bilinear maps was proposed in [8]. In [4], Desmedt raised the problem of generalizing the designated verifier signature concept to a multi
designated verifier scheme. This question was answered affirmatively in [9], where a construction of multi designated
verifiers signature scheme was proposed.
Motivated by privacy issues associated with dissemination of signed digital certificates, Steinfeld et. al. pro-

posed the notion of Universal Designated-Verifier Signature
(UDVS) schemes [10]. In this notion, a signature holder can
designate the signature to any desired designated verifier,
using the verifier’s public key. They also showed that bilinear maps allow an elegant construction of a UDVS scheme.
An efficient extension of standard RSA/Schnorr signature
schemes to UDVS schemes was proposed in [11].

1.1. Our contributions
We extend the notion of UDVS schemes to Universal Designated Multi Verifier Signature (UDMVS) schemes. In the
new notion, a signature holder can designate the signature
to a group of designated verifiers. We present two schemes
that fit into our model. We show an efficient construction of
UDMVS schemes based on bilinear pairing. We provide security proofs for our schemes based on the random oracle
model.

1.2. Organization of The Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we will provide some preliminaries and background required in this paper. In section 3, we define the
notion of UDMVS schemes. In section 4, we present a concrete UDMVS scheme based on the bilinear pairing. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. Preliminaries
2.1. Basic Concepts on Bilinear Pairings
Let G1 , G2 be cyclic additive groups generated by P1 , P2 ,
respectively, whose order are a prime q. Let GM be a cyclic
multiplicative group with the same order q. We assume there
is an isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1 such that ψ(P2 ) = P1 . Let
ê : G1 × G2 → GM be a bilinear mapping with the following properties:
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1. Bilinearity: ê(aP, bQ)
=
P ∈ G1 , Q ∈ G2 , a, b, ∈ Zq .

ê(P, Q)ab

for all

2. Non-degeneracy: There exists P ∈ G1 , Q ∈ G2 such
that ê(P, Q) = 1.
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute ê(P, Q) for all P ∈ G1 , Q ∈ G2 .
For simplicity, hereafter, we set G1 = G2 and P1 = P2 . We
note that our scheme can be easily modified for a general
case, when G1 = G2 .
Bilinear pairing instance generator is defined as a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm IG that takes as input
a security parameter  and returns a uniformly random tuple param = (p, G1 , GM , ê, P ) of bilinear parameters, including a prime number p of size , a cyclic additive group
G1 of order q, a multiplicative group GM of order q, a bilinear map ê : G1 × G1 → GM and a generator P of G1 . For
a group G of prime order, we denote the set G∗ = G \ {O}
where O is the identity element of the group.

2.2. Complexity Assumptions
Definition 1. Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Problem.
Given randomly chosen P ∈ G1 , as well as aP, bP and
cP (for unknown randomly chosen a, b, c ∈ Zq ), compute
ê(P, P )abc .
For the BDH problem to be hard, G1 and GM must be
chosen so that there is no known algorithm for efficiently
solving the Diffie-Hellman problem in either G1 or GM .
We note that if the BDH problem is hard for a pairing ê,
then it follows that ê is non-degenerate.
Definition 2. BDH Assumption. If IG is a BDH parameter generator, the advantage AdvIG (A) that an algorithm A
has in solving the BDH problem is defined to be the probability that the algorithm A outputs ê(P, P )abc on inputs
G1 , GM , ê, P, aP, bP, cP , where (G1 , GM , ê) is the output
of IG for sufficiently large security parameter , P is a random generator of G1 and a, b, c are random elements of Zq .
The BDH assumption is that AdvIG (A) is negligible for all
efficient algorithms A.

3. Universal Designated Multi Verifier Signature Scheme

2. Signer Key Generation (SKeygen): is an algorithm
that accepts a common scheme parameter cp and outputs a secret/public key pair (skS , pkS ).
3. Verifiers Key Generation (VKeygen): is an algorithm that accepts a common scheme parameter cp and
a number n as the number of verifiers, outputs n secret/public key pairs (ski , pki ), i = 1, · · · , n, for n
verifiers.
4. Signature Generation (Sign): is an algorithm that
accepts a common scheme parameter cp, a signer’s secret key skS and a message m, outputs signer’s publicly verifiable signature σ.
5. Public Verification (Verify): is an algorithm that
accepts a common scheme parameter cp, a signer’s
public key pkS , a message m and a signature σ, outputs True if the verification is correct or ⊥ otherwise.
6. Designation (Designate): is an algorithm that accepts a common scheme parameter cp, a signer’s public key pkS , verifiers’ public key pk1 , · · · , pkn and a
message/signature pair (m, σ), outputs a designated
multi verifier signature σ̂.
7. Designated Verification (DVerify): is an algorithm
that accepts a common scheme parameter cp, a signer’s
public key pkS , verifiers’ secret key ski , i = 1, · · · , n
and a message/designated multi verifier signature pair
(m, σ̂), outputs True if the verification is correct or ⊥
otherwise.

3.1. Security Notions
An UDMVS scheme should satisfy the following security
properties.
Completeness. We require UDMVS scheme to satisfy the
following probability equation:
P r[DVerify(cp, pkS , sk1 , · · · , skn , m, σ̂)] = 1
where cp ← Setup(k), (skS , pkS ) ← SKeygen(cp),
(ski , pki ) ← VKeygen(cp, n), σ ← Sign(cp, skS , m),
True ← Verify(cp, pkS , m, σ), σ̂ ← Designate(cp,
pkS , pk1 , · · · , pkn , m, σ)

The definition of a Universal Designated Multi Verifier
Signature (UDMVS) scheme is very similar to a UDVS
scheme. A UDMVS is a tuple of seven algorithms (that may
be randomized) as follows:

Non-Transferability. We require a UDMVS scheme to be
non-transferable. The non-transferability property is ensured by a transcript simulation algorithm that
can be performed by all designated verifiers to produce an
indistinguishable signature from the one that should be produced by the signature holder.

1. Common Parameter Generation (Setup): is an algorithm that accepts a security parameter k and outputs a string consisting of common scheme parameters
that are publicly shared by all users, cp.

Unforgeability. We provide a formal definition of existential unforgeability of a UDMVS scheme under a chosen
message attack (UF-CMA). It is defined using the following game between an adversary A and a challenger C:
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• Let A be the UF-CMA adversary. In the startup of the
game, C provides the common scheme parameter, cp,
to A, where cp ← Setup(k) and k is the security parameter.

P ∈ G1 , together with a cryptographic hash function H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 . The common scheme parameter is cp = (DG , P, H0 ).

• C provides the signer’s public key pkS and verifiers’
public key pk1 , · · · , pkn to A.

• SKeygen: Given cp, pick a random skS ∈ Z∗q
and compute pkS = skS P . Let Ppub = pkS ,
the signer’s public key is (cp, Ppub ) and the private key is (cp, skS ).

• At any time, A can query the hash oracle for the hash
result on any message mi of his choice up to qH times
(which is polynomial in k). C will answer A’s queries
by providing the hash value H(mi ).

R

• VKeygen: Given cp and n as the number of the veriR

fiers, pick a different random ski ∈ Z∗q , i = 1, · · · , n
for each verifier and compute pki = ski P . The public key for verifier i is (cp, pki ) and the private key is
(cp, ski ).

• At any time, A can query the signing oracle for the signature on any message mi of his choice specifying any
user he likes up to qS times (which is polynomial in
k). C will answer A’s queries by providing the value
σ = Sign(cp, skS , mi ) where skS is the corresponding secret key of the specified user queried by A for
mi .

• Sign: Given the signer’s secret key (cp, skS ), and a
message m, compute σ = skS H0 (m) as the signature
on m.

• C will not answer any Verify request because A can
verify the signature by himself.

• Verify: Given the signer’s public key (cp, Ppub ) and
a message/signature pair (m, σ), accept the signature

• Eventually, A will output a valid UDMVS for a message m∗ that has never been queried to the signing oracle before, for the designated verifiers with public keys
pk1 , · · · , pkn .

iff ê(P, σ) = ê(Ppub , H0 (m)) holds with equality.
Otherwise, return ⊥.

The success probability of an adversary to win the game
is defined by
F −U DM V S−CM A
SuccU
(k)
A

Definition 3. UF-CMA Secure We say that a UDMVS
scheme is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack if the probability of success of any polynomially bounded adversary in the above game is negligible. In
other words,
F −U DM V S−CM A
(k)
SuccU
A

≤

4. A Concrete UDMVS Scheme from Bilinear
Pairing
4.1. A Trivial Scheme
We start our concrete UDMVS scheme by modifying the
UDVS scheme proposed in [10]. We note that this scheme
can be trivially modified to achieve a UDMVS scheme as
follows:
• Setup: Select a bilinear group-pair (G1 , GM )
of prime order q, where q = |G1 | = |GM |
with description string DG specifying a bilinear map ê : G1 × G1 → GM and a generator

?

• Designate: Given a set of verifiers’ public key
(cp, pk1 , · · · , pkn ) and a message/signature pair
(m, σ), compute σ̂i = ê(pki , σ), for all i = 1, · · · , n.
• DVerify: Given a signer’s public key (cp, pkS ),
a set of verifiers’ secret/public key (cp, (sk1 , pk1 ),
· · · , (skn , pkn )) and a set of message/designated
verifier signatures (m, σˆ1 , · · ·, σˆn ), accept iff
?

σ̂i = ê(Ppub , H0 (m))ski , i = 1, · · · , n, holds with
equality. Otherwise, return ⊥.
Correctness. The correctness of the trivial UDMVS
?
scheme is justified as follows: σ̂i = ê(Ppub , H0 (m))ski =
ski
ê(skS P, H0 (m)) = ê(ski P, skS H0 (m)) = ê(pki , σ). 
Non-Transferability. The non-transferability is achieved
because each verifier can simulate the signature σ̂i by producing an indistinguishable signature σ́i from the one that
was designated by a signature holder as follows: σ́i =
ê(Ppub , H0 (m))ski = σ̂i We note that since Ppub is publicly available, any verifier can produce such a signature using his own private key (cp, ski ).
Efficiency. The signature produced by the Designate algorithm is of the form (σˆ1 , · · · , σˆn ), which results in an
n|G1 | bits signature. In the next section, we will show an
efficient construction of UDMVS scheme that only requires
|G1 | bit length. Since this construction is trivial, we omit
the formal definition of existential unforgeability for this
scheme.
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4.2. An Efficient UDMVS Scheme
In this section, we present an efficient UDMVS scheme
from bilinear pairing. The new scheme is more efficient
compared to the scheme that we presented earlier. However, the model is quite different from the one that we used
above. In this scheme, the verification requires a collaboration of all of the designated verifiers (in contrast to the previous construction where each verifier can verify by himself/herself). This leads to a very efficient scheme, that only
requires |G1 | bit signature. The construction is as follows:
• Setup, SKeygen, VKeygen, Sign,
Verify: The same as our trivial scheme.
• Designate: Given a set of verifiers’ public key
(cp, pk1 , · · · , pkn ) and a message/signature pair
n
(m, σ), compute σ̂ = ê(σ, i=1 pki )
• DVerify: Given a signer’s public key (cp, Ppub ),
a set of verifiers’ secret/public key (cp, (sk1 , pk1 ),
· · · , (skn , pkn )) and a message/designated multi verifier signature pair (m, σ̂), each verifier performs the
following algorithm:
– Sign the message m as σi = ski H0 (m) and publish it among the n verifiers.
– Run Verify(cp, pkj , m, σj ), j = 1, · · · , n to
validate all the σj received. Fail if ⊥ is returned
in any one of the signatures.
? n
– Test whether σ̂ = i=1 ê(σi , Ppub ) holds with
equality. Return true if it holds, or ⊥ otherwise.
Correctness. The correctness of the DVerify al? n
gorithm
is justified as follows:
nσ̂ = i=1 ê(σi , Ppub ) =
n
ê(ski H0 (m), skS P )= i=1 ê(skS H0 (m),
nski P ) =
i=1
n
n
ê(σ,
sk
P
)
=
ê(σ,
sk
P
)
=
ê(σ,
i
i
i=1
i=1
i=1 pki ).

Non-Transferability. Let n verifiers collude to generate a
signature on a message m. Each of them will perform the
following:
• Sign the message as σi = ski H0 (m) and send it to the
other verifiers.
• Check if all of the σj , j = 1, · · · , n received are valid,
if no, then fail.
n
• Compute σ́ = i=1 ê(σi , Ppub )
Note that σ́ is indistinguishable from the signature σ̂ that
should have been generated by a signature holder. Hence,
no other third party will be convinced with the authenticity of the signature. However, a user in the verifiers group
will be convinced because if he/she has not colluded, then
he/she is ensured that the signature is authentic.
Unforgeability. Let A be a UF-CMA adversary in the unforgeability game. We will build a simulator B that will

use A to solve an instance of the BDH problem. The purpose of the algorithm B is to compute ê(P, P )abc from
(P, aP, bP, cP ) for unknown a, b, c, which is given in the
beginning of the game. The simulation is modified from [1]
and is as follows:
• B provides A the common scheme parameter cp and
sends aP as the public key Ppub of the signer to A.
R

• B generates some random numbers ui ∈ Z∗q and computes ui cP as the public keys pki , i = 1, · · · , n of the
verifiers and gives them to A.
• Every time when A issues a hash query on any message mi , i = 1, · · · , qH of his choice, B will answer
the query as follows.
– B maintains a hash record [m, H(m), r, f ] to
store all the hash results, it grows as new hash result has replied.
– If the query on mi has not been asked before (and
hence, it does not exist in the record maintained
R

by B), then B picks a random number ri ∈ Z∗q
and flips a {0, 1} coin that has probability α on
outcome 0 and 1 − α on outcome 1. If 0 is obtained, B answers with H(mi ) = ri P . Otherwise, B answers with H(mi ) = bP + ri P . B updates his record with (mi , H(mi ), ri , fi ), where
fi ∈ {0, 1} is the result of the coin flipping.
– If the query on mi has been asked before,
then B looks up his record to obtain the entry (mi , H(mi ), ri , fi ) and answers with the
stored value H(mi ).
• Every time when A issues a sign query on any message mi , i = 1, · · · , qS and any public key pkj , j =
1, · · · , n of his choice, B will answer the query as follows:
– If the query on (mi , pkj ) has not been asked before (and hence, it does not exist in the record
maintained by B), then B picks a random numR

ber ri ∈ Z∗q and answers the query with ri pkj . B
updates his record with (mi , ri P, ri , 0). Note that
ri pkj = ri skj P = skj ri P = skj H(mi ), which
is equal to the signature on mi signed with the
private key corresponds to pkj .
– If the query on (mi , pkj ) has been asked before,
then B looks up on his record to find the entry
(mi , H(mi ), ri , fi ). If fi is found to be equal to
1 (i.e. H(mi ) = bP + ri P ), then B terminates
and fails the simulation. Otherwise if fi is found
to be equal to 0 (i.e. H(mi ) = ri P ), then B return ri P as the answer.
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• Eventually, A will output a forged UDMVS pair
(m∗ , σ ∗ ) designated to all the verifiers on a message m∗ that seems to have been signed by the signer.
B needs to look up on his record to find the entry (mi , H(mi ), ri , fi ) where mi = m∗ . If m∗ has not
been queried (i.e. the entry is not found), then B terminates the game with failure. But since the random values ri are randomly picked over Z∗q , thanks
to its uniform randomness, the hash results are distributed over G1 and the probability that A hits the
hash result H(m∗ ) is 1q where q is a large prime,
which is negligible. Hence m∗ must have been
queried during the hash queries (i.e. A has obtained H(m∗ ) from B) and B is able to find the
entry (m∗ , H(m∗ ), ri∗ , fi∗ ) where i∗ denotes the index where mi∗ = m∗ . In order to compute the
answer for the given instance to the BDH problem, H(m∗ ) has to be in the form of bP + ri∗ P
(i.e. fi∗ = 1). If it is not, B terminates and fails
the simulation.
Otherwise, B calculates and outn
−1
puts σ ∗( i=1 ui ) · ê(aP, cP )−ri∗ .
If B does not terminate in the simulation, the answer computed by B is equal to :
n

=
=
=
=
=

−1

σ ∗( i=1 ui ) · ê(aP,
cP )−ri∗

n
−1
( n
u
ê(σ, i=1 pki ) i=1 i ) · ê(aP, cP )−ri∗

n
−1
n
ê(aH(m∗ ), i=1 ui cP )( i=1 ui ) · ê(aP, cP )−ri∗
−r
ê(a(bP + ri∗ P ), cP ) · ê(aP, cP ) i∗
ê(abP, cP ) · ê(ari∗ P, cP ) · ê(−ari∗ P, cP )
ê(P, P )abc

Hence B has successfully solved the BDH problem for the given instance (P, aP, bP, cP ). Let
F −U DM V S−CM A
β = SuccU
(k), the probability that
A
B successes is:
P r[fi = 0, i = 1, · · · , qS ]×P r[fi∗ = 1]×β = αqS (1−α)β
In order to have a maximum probability of success, we
take derivative on this value and found it is maximize at
α = qS (qS + 1)−1 . Hence B solves the BDH problem with
probability:
(qS (qS + 1)−1 )qS (1 − qS (qS + 1)−1 )β
S
)qS ( qSβ+1 )
= ( qSq+1
1 −qS
= (1 + qS )
( qSβ+1 )
β
≥ e(qS +1)
where e is the base for natural logarithm. In other words,
B solved the BDH problem with non-negligible probability,
which contradicts with the BDH assumption. Therefore, we
complete the proof.
Efficiency. The signature produced by our UDMVS scheme
is |G1 | bit length, which is very efficient.

5. Conclusion
In this paper, we firstly proposed the notion of Universal
Designated Multi Verifier Signature (UDMVS) schemes.
We formalized this notion by proposing their model and security requirements. We proceeded with an efficient construction of UDMVS scheme based on bilinear pairing that
only requires |G1 | bit length signature and provided a formal security proof. Furthermore, we note that if we combine the Sign and Designate algorithms in our efficient
UDMVS scheme, we will obtain a designated multi verifier
scheme, which turns out to be more efficient than the construction proposed in [9].
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